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After	Brexit,	the	UK	should	have	a	democratic	right	of
return
Many	people	believe	that	the	UK’s	decision	to	leave	the	EU	spells	trouble	for	both	country
and	continent,	yet	by	and	large	think	that	the	exit	vote	and	process,	painful	though	they
may	be,	adhere	to	the	rules	and	spirit	of	democratic	self-government.	Peter
Niesen	and	Markus	Patberg	argue	that	in	one	important	respect	this	is	not	the	case,
since	fully	democratic	credentials	require	reversibility	in	decision-making	and	are
incompatible	with	an	irreversible	loss	of	political	rights.
The	notion	of	reversibility	may	sound	treacherous,	as	it	brings	to	mind	a	long-standing	practice	of	repeated
referendums	on	EU-related	decisions	in	member	states.	Where	votes	ran	counter	to	the	goal	of	an	‘ever	closer
union’,	governments	have	had	their	electorates	repeat	referendums,	as	in	the	case	of	the	two	Irish	referendums	on
the	Lisbon	Treaty	in	2008	and	2009.	Pleas	for	reversibility	seem	to	echo	the	questionable	strategy	of	repeating	EU
referendums	with	negative	results	for	as	long	as	it	takes	for	citizens	to	fall	in	line	with	Brussels	diktat.	We	advocate
neither	a	second	referendum	nor	a	stop	to	Brexit.	The	Brexit	decision	should	be	implemented,	respecting	the
democratic	decision	by	referendum	and	act	of	Parliament.	However,	for	democratic	reasons,	we	argue	that	the	EU
should	keep	the	door	open	for	a	return	of	the	UK	by	a	unilateral	decision	of	its	people.
One	reason	for	the	significance	of	reversibility	is	that	electorates	change.	A	52	percent	majority	of	the	electorate
voted	to	leave	the	EU	in	the	2016	referendum.	Already	now,	there	is	an	imbalance	resulting	from	the	fact	that	the
‘leave’	vote	was	significantly	higher	among	older	voters	than	among	younger	voters.	Important	demographic	changes
have	taken	place	since	the	referendum.	Arguably,	even	if	people	have	not	changed	their	minds	about	Brexit,	there	is
reason	to	think	that	the	majorities	will	soon	be	reversed	through	natural	causes.	Another,	even	more	significant
reason	is	that	people	have	a	right	to	change	their	minds.	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau	thought	that,	to	the	contrary,	once
the	general	will	has	been	fixed,	those	in	the	minority	should	hasten	to	adopt	the	majority	view,	since	they	must	have
been	wrong	in	the	first	place.	Today,	most	democratic	theorists	reject	this	idea.	They	hold	that	persisting
disagreement	is	productive,	since	democracy	includes	the	right	to	learn	from	experience,	to	re-evaluate	reasons	and
arguments,	and	to	reassess	issues	in	light	of	new	information	or	changed	circumstances.
The	non-reversibility	of	exit	decisions	is	a	flaw	in	the	institutional	design	of	the	EU	polity	–	and	it	is	a	significant	one
because	EU	withdrawal	implies	that	individuals	lose	political	rights,	many	of	them	against	their	will.	Where	the	will	of
the	people	is	to	become	law,	and	the	people	cannot	be	ruled	out	to	undergo	a	change	of	mind	later	on,	the	revised
will	of	the	people	must	be	capable	of	becoming	law	as	well.	Yet,	after	Brexit,	a	majority	decision	with	the	opposite
outcome	will	not	bring	the	UK	back	into	the	EU.	The	UK	may,	of	course,	re-apply	for	membership,	but	its	citizens	will
not	have	a	definitive	say	in	the	outcome	as	they	do	now.	They	will	be	treated	as	petitioners,	not	co-sovereigns,	no
different	from	the	nationals	of	first-time	applicants	like	Turkey	or	Georgia.	Government	initiatives	to	re-apply,	and
likewise	the	EU	negotiation	position,	may	depend	on	tactical	considerations,	so	that	the	people’s	will	toward	an
eventual	re-entry	will	fail	to	be	conclusive.	To	ensure	reversibility	of	the	Brexit	decision,	we	recommend	Article	50	of
the	Treaty	on	European	Union	(TEU)	be	amended	to	allow	for	the	re-entry	of	former	member	states,	by	referendum
or	act	of	parliament,	or,	if	this	cannot	be	achieved,	by	providing	an	identical	re-entry	clause	in	the	withdrawal
agreement	(if	there	be	one).
The	idea	to	match	the	right	to	unilateral	exit	from	the	EU	with	a	unilateral	option	of	re-entry	may	come	as	a	surprise.
Political	philosophers	criticizing	Brexit	as	undemocratic	attack	Article	50	for	its	privileging	of	nation-state
sovereignty.	They	believe	that	because	the	separation	was	decided	unilaterally,	it	did	not	take	sufficiently	into
account	all	those	outside	the	UK	who	are	and	will	be	massively	affected	by	Brexit.	The	thought	is	that	where
decisions	have	a	huge	influence	on	people’s	life	chances,	those	concerned	should	have	a	say	in	the	decision.	We
think	this	view	is	too	simple	because	it	ignores	the	nature	of	the	EU	as	a	voluntary	association.	The	argument
confuses	the	free	consensus	to	be	and	remain	members	of	a	federation	of	states	with	the	coercive	predicament	of
the	regions	and	provinces	of	nation-states.	Whereas	regions	or	sub-state	nations	cannot	unilaterally	secede	from
(federal)	states,	federations	of	states	can	be	entered	into	and	left	freely.	The	citizens	of	the	EU	member	states,	in
contrast	to	the	citizens	of,	say,	the	Free	and	Hanseatic	City	of	Hamburg,	as	part	of	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany,
have	not	given	up	their	right	to	full	political	self-determination.	The	democratic	dilemma	is	that,	under	the	current	EU
treaties,	once	a	people	have	exercised	its	freedom	to	leave,	they	are	not	free	to	reverse	their	decision.
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In	the	remainder	of	this	post,	we	want	to	sharpen	our	proposal	by	contrasting	it	with	two	rivalling	suggestions.	First,	some
authors	have	argued	that	the	main	problem	of	Brexit	is	that	people	will	be	losing	their	European	civil	rights	such	as	freedom
of	movement,	and	that	it	is	highly	unusual	to	be	stripped	of	one’s	civil	rights	through	a	simple	majority	decision.	The
material	rights	at	least	of	those	unwilling	to	lose	them	should,	therefore,	be	reinstated	through	an	individual	application
process.	This	argument	sounds	attractive,	not	least	since	it	would	give	European	citizenship	a	meaningful	role	independently
from	nation-state	citizenship.	But	there	are	several	things	that	are	wrong	with	it.
It	is	deeply	asymmetric	in	benefitting	some	UK	citizens	without	ensuring	reciprocal	openness	for	other	EU	citizens
(the	EU	could	try	to	negotiate	such	an	arrangement,	but	this	would	obviously	go	against	one	of	the	major	motivations
of	Brexit	and	render	it	almost	meaningless).	At	the	same	time,	it	propels	inequality	in	the	UK	since	it	privileges	the
interests	of	the	‘movers’	over	those	of	the	‘stayers’	among	British	citizens.	Finally,	it	addresses	EU	citizens	as	private
beneficiaries	rather	than	as	members	of	a	self-governing	collective.	It	empowers	border-crossing	social	and
economic	activities,	but	fails	to	address	the	problem	of	the	loss	of	political	rights.
A	second	idea	is	to	continue	the	representation	of	British	citizens	in	the	European	Parliament	after	the	UK	has	left
the	EU.	This	scheme	agrees	with	the	first	in	that	EU	citizenship	derives	from	member	state	citizenship,	but	need	not
completely	cease	with	it.	UK	citizens	would	retain	their	political	rights,	but	not	necessarily	their	substantive	European
rights,	i.e.	their	freedom	of	movement.	This	would	ensure	that	the	entire	UK	citizenry	would	be	recognised	impartially,
in	its	Europhile	as	well	as	in	its	Eurosceptic	segments.	Continued	representation	in	the	EP	would	keep	alive	the
possibility	of	a	re-entry	which	could	be	campaigned	and	lobbied	for,	and	do	away	with	the	inegalitarian
consequences	under	a	private	remain	scheme	for	European	citizenship.
What	counts	in	favour	of	this	proposal	is	that	it	would	put	the	horse	before	the	cart:	it	would	install	political	rights	to
potentially	bring	back	rights	to	free	movement,	and	not	bring	back	rights	without	representation	as	under	the	first
suggestion.	A	disadvantage	of	the	idea	is	the	institutional	weakness	of	the	European	Parliament,	which	is	only	a	co-
legislative	organ.	While	UK	citizens’	ongoing	representation	would	allow	them	to	keep	a	foot	in	the	door,	a	re-entry	to
the	EU	could	not	be	brought	about	through	this	channel.	In	light	of	this,	the	price	that	EU	citizens	would	have	to	pay
seems	too	high:	to	allow	UK	citizens	to	continue	to	influence	European	legislation,	although	no	longer	being	subject
to	it.
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Our	own	idea	agrees	with	the	second	suggestion	in	that	it	finds	an	irreversible	loss	of	political	rights	intolerable.	While
Brexit	may	or	may	not	be	a	good	idea	in	its	consequences,	it	is	a	sure	sign	of	political	regression	to	have	one’s
democratic	options	reduced.	But	it	is	wrong	to	devise	‘business	as	usual’	responses	to	the	exit	decision,	or	to	try	and
hinder	an	electorate	from	ceding	its	European	rights	alongside	its	membership	in	the	federation.	True,	at	the	nation-
state	level,	we	would	insist	that	citizens	cannot	vote	to	exclude	co-citizens	(and	themselves)	from	the	rights	to
political	self-determination.	But	Brexit	is	different	in	that	UK	citizens	will	not	be	generally	disenfranchised,	as	they
remain	members	of	a	nation-state	democracy.	Our	suggestion,	therefore,	is	to	establish	a	privileged	return	route	to
renewed	membership	for	former	member	states,	in	other	words,	to	let	the	UK	re-enter	by	a	unilateral	decision	of	its
people,	under	the	legal	and	financial	conditions	of	the	pre-Brexit	status	quo.	The	basis	for	this	could	be	an
amendment	of	Article	50	TEU	or	a	provision	in	the	withdrawal	agreement.	This	would	leave	UK	citizens
disenfranchised	from	EU	citizenship,	but	empowered	to	re-instate	it	after	Brexit.
In	conclusion,	we	take	up	two	remaining	objections.	One	objection	is	that	such	a	clause,	if	provided	for	in	the	EU
Treaty,	could	provide	an	incentive	to	opt	in	and	out	according	to	the	necessities	of	the	day,	which	would	make	polity
stability	impossible.	However,	given	the	huge	ramifications	of	entry	and	exit,	it	seems	highly	unlikely	that	any
citizenry	would	toy	around	with	such	an	option.	A	temporary	exit	could	not	be	used	to	cover	for,	e.g.,	a	cheapening	of
domestic	rule-of-law	standards,	since	re-entry	would	presuppose	constitutional	continuity	with	European	Union
standards.
Another,	more	principled,	objection	is	that	the	social	and	economic	consequences	of	Brexit	and	similar	opt-outs
cannot	simply	be	undone.	Even	if	the	UK	were	to	re-join	the	EU	under	current	legal	and	financial	conditions,
circumstances	will	have	changed,	and	perhaps	a	state	of	disrepair	would	be	hard	to	overcome.	Even	though	a
democratic	society	can	get	in	and	out	of	nuclear	energy	provision,	nuclear	waste	will	continue	to	radiate.	But	a	right
to	bring	back	an	ex	ante	state	of	the	world	is	not	part	of	our	claim.	We	argue	that	political	decisions	and	the
revocation	of	legal	statuses	need	to	be	reversible,	not	that	a	social,	natural,	or	economic	status	quo	would	have	to	be
preserved	to	return	to.
The	important	reason	in	favour	of	a	re-entry	clause	is	that	it	would	make	EU	withdrawal	reversible.	It	would	give	the
UK	electorate	the	chance	to	reconsider	their	decision	when	and	if	they	wish,	and	preserve	to	them	the	agency	so
highly	prized	in	the	referendum	process.	It	would	ensure	that	there	would	be	no	irrevocable	loss	of	political	rights,
which	would	then	be	instrumental	in	bringing	back	material	rights,	although	any	such	rights	would	have	to	remain
inactive.	Former	EU	citizens	would	not	fall	back	to	the	status	of	third-country	nationals	but	encounter	current	EU
citizens	as	co-citizens	‘on	stand-by’.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author(s)	and	neither	those	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog	nor	of	the	LSE.
Peter	Niesen	and	Markus	Patberg	are	political	theorists	at	Hamburg	University	and	co-investigators	of	the	DFG-
funded	project	“Reclaiming	Constituent	Power?	Emerging	Counter-Narratives	of	EU	Constitutionalisation”.	Their	text
will	appear	in	a	volume	with	philosophical	interventions	on	the	European	Union,	edited	by	Marco	Meyer.
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